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The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code
David Mellinkoff[
Uniformity, like inbreeding, can produce works of genius or mon-
sters, sometimes both. A case in point is the Uniform Commercial Code.
Twenty-five years after the start of the brainstorming and salesman-
ship that has swept the UCC across the nation and onto the statute
books of all but one state, it is now nearly forgotten that uniformity is
only one of several avowed purposes of the UCC. Another purpose is to
"clarify... the law governing commercial transactions...."' Yet when
we learn from the Code that debtor can mean someone who is not in-
debted,2 that gasoline may be a farm product,2 that identification of
goods "occurs" when goods have been identified 4and that you may
revoke an irrevocable credit,' it is pardonable to suspect that clarifica-
tion has been junked for the illusion of uniformity. A more detailed
look at the Code will harden suspicion into conviction: for all its
substantive contributions, the UCC is a slipshod job of draftsmanship.
The Code itself is devoid of the uniformity it prescribes for the sub-
stance of the law. The language is now clear, now mud; now grammati-
cal, now illiterate; now consistent, now inconsistent, slapdash and
slovenly. It wallows in definition that does not define and definition
that misleads-definition for the sake of forgotten definition. It includes
many ways of saying the same thing, and many ways of saying nothing.
The word reasonable, effective in small doses, has been administered by
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B. 1935, Stanford Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1939, Harvard University.
1. UNIFOR.I COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2)(a) [hereinafter cited by section only].
2. See § 9-105(l)(d).
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the bucket, leaving the corpus of the Code reeling in dizzy confusion.
And overshadowing all else, even in a gallery of elaborate ugliness, are
the ambiguity and vacuity inherent in the determined and needless use
of the long, long sentence.
Some specifics are now in order. Be warned, however, that even an
abridged catalog of the UCC's language vices makes a long, long list.
Once convinced or revolted by one category of vice, the impatient
reader may leaf ahead to the next and ultimately to the denouement,
which begins on page 720. All of the UCC citations in this article refer
to the 1962 Official Text replete with Comments of the draftsmen, as
reproduced by West Publishing Company in a watery blue paperback
731 pages long. The pages are somewhat small than those in a Sears,
Roebuck catalog. Although it might have helped, none of the italics in
this article appear in the UCC or elsewhere.
I. The Definitions
The striving for precision which is a noteworthy characteristic of the
language of the law0 often leads us to define, whether defining is needed
or not. Definition gives an appearance of precision that warms the
cockles of the draftsman's heart. At one stroke you can say what you
mean, give an easy reference tag for later parts of a writing, and provide
the basis for clarity, brevity, and consistency. The rewards are so allur-
ing that it is easy to overlook the prime difficulty-the process of de-
fining-and the attendant burden of remembering to follow your own
definitions. The UCC has opted for the rewards and blinked at the
difficulties. So much in the UCC is labeled "definition" that it is almost
irreverent to ask the preliminary question "Are there really any defini.
tions at all in the UCC?"
A. "Unless the context otherwise requires"
The first of a long series of sections containing "definitions" warns of
more to come, and adds the ominous preface to definition: "unless the
context otherwise requires . . . ."7 The phrase is repeated in various
definitional sections of other articles.8 What does it do to the definitions
that follow?
The most charitable answer is: "Nothing The phrase is a redun.
6. D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw §§ 17, 116, 129 (1963).
7. § 1-201.
8. §§ 2-103(1), 2-106(1), 3-102(1), 4-104(l), 4-105(l), 5-103(1), 7-102(1), 8-102(1), 9-10j5(1).
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dancy, expressing the truism that context can choke the life out of any
word, and make black mean white." Of course, if the phrase means
nothing, why not delete it? That is just what Ohio did.9 This Buckeye
deviationism was denounced by the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code. It said the words were a "customary device
of statutory draftsmanship," "standard in definitional sections through-
out the Code," which there was no "good" or "apparent reason" to
abandon. 10 Connecticut heretics got a similar treatment: "The pre-
amble omitted in this variation is standard in all definitional sections
throughout the Code. There is no apparent reason why it should be
omitted."'1
But there was. For customary or not, the device is not standard in
the UCC, and is not used in even nearly "all the definitional sections"
of the UCC.2 Perhaps the draftsman nodded. But no. When Oregon
put the "customary" words in where the UCC had omitted them from
a definitional section, that too was rejected by the Board. It lumped
Oregon's addition of "unless the context otherwise requires" together
with a change of numbering and dismissed both as "purely a matter of
style."'13 From this one might easily conclude that the words are in or
out of the UCC because they happen to be in or out, and that apart
from the need for uniformity it makes no difference what is in or what
is out. There is, however, another possibility.
If some UCC definitions are to apply "unless the context otherwise
requires," and some are to apply without that qualification, a decent
respect for the draftsman gives rise to an inference that the difference
is intended.' 4 If the phrase does not appear often enough to establish
a consistent pattern, it nonetheless appears too often to be dismissed as
a happen-so or printer's error. Possibly the draftsman, when he has
thought of it, has tried to duck the responsibility for his own defini-
tions. He could be saying, "I think this is what I mean-usually. But
for the love of Coke, don't hold me to it" Perhaps he is trying to shuck
the burden of writing so that the context will not otherwise require.
But who creates the context?
9. See §§ 2-106(1), 4-104(1), 5-103(l); 13 OHIo REv. CODE §§ 1302.01(11), 1804.01(A),
1305.01(A) (1962).
10. P~umw EDrroaIAL BoArD FOR TnE UNIFOPRm COMMERCIAL CODE, REPOrt No. 2,
at 30, 73, 101 (1965).
11. Id. at 100, referring to CONN. GEN. STAT. AiN. § 42a-5-103(1) (1958).
12. See, e.g., §§ 2-104, 2-105, 3-410, 5-108, 6-102, 8-201, 8-302, 8-303, 9-106, 9-107, 9-109,
9-301(3).
13. REPORT No. 2, supra note 10, at 181, referring to Oa. RE%. STAT. § 79.1060 (1963).
14. Cf. § 1-102(4).
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The draftsman faces a problem different from that of the lexicogra-
pher, who defines and waits. That "humble drudge" whose fate is "to
be exposed to censure, without hope of praise . ," 15 is at the mercy
of every genius or illiterate who seizes his hard-defined words and plops
them down in a thousand novel contexts; but once resigned to his lot,
he may disclaim responsibility for changes in either the world or its
use of words. The draftsman cannot, even when he wants to.1 Yet once
he has decided to turn word-maker, he has the distinct advantage of
being able to decide not only upon the definition, but on each of the
thousands of words that will provide the setting for his defined word.
Thousands of decisions. But that is what the defining draftsman has
undertaken. If he doesn't want to play word-maker, he should never
begin. If he essays the role, he can at least try to create a context that
will be hospitable.
For example, take two definitions under the heading "unless the
context otherwise requires."
"Banking day" means that part of any day on which a bank is open
to the public for carrying on substantially all of its banking func-
tions.17
Five paragraphs on, that newborn banking day means something else-
not part of a day, but a date:
"Midnight deadline" with respect to a bank is midnight on its
next banking day following the banking day on which it receives
the relevant item or notice or from which the time for taking ac-
tion commences to run, whichever is later. 8
Here there was no compulsion to create for banking day a context that
requires a sense contrary to the definition. The reader who has just
absorbed banking day finds "midnight on its next banking day" a
mind-twisting anachronism, since he knows that the "part of any day
on which a bank is open to the public" rarely has a midnight. Jerked
into wakefulness, he will wonder why the definition of banking day
didn't say that it could be a date as well as a part of a day, or in the
alternative why midnight deadline didn't speak of a midnight on the
date of "its next banking day."
15. S. JOHNSON, Preface to 1 A DiariONAIY OF THE ENGUSI LANGUAGE, at b (4th cd.
1775).
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Agreement and contract create a more widespread confusion. As
defined:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances includ-
ing course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance
as provided in this Act .... 19
Agreement is distinguished from contract, whicl "means the total legal
obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this
Act and any other applicable rules of law."20 Though bargain is no-
where defined, verbally at least this looks like a straightforward distinc-
tion between bargain and legal obligation. But with a little bit of
context, the definition as well as the distinction become mangled be-
yond recognition.
In one breath we are told that Article 9 "applies to security interests
created by contract ... ,"21 and a moment later that "unless the con-
text otherwise requires" a "'Security agreement' means an agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest."2 2 Again, Section
9-312(1) refers to Section 9-316 on "contractual subordination," but
Section 9-316 itself speaks of "subordination by agreement." Again, the
warrant of merchantability "implied in a contract" for ie sale of
goods23 is followed by the minimum requirements of merchantability.
Goods must, among other things, "pass without objection" under the
"contract description" (rather than as agreed), but may vary as "per-
mitted by the agreement" (rather than the contract), and must be "la-
beled as the agreement [not the contract] may require."24
In this rapid pirouette of agreement and contract, repeated in other
sections, 25 one sees for fleeting moments the face of bargain and the
backside of obligation in one blurred image with the backside of bar-
gain and the face of obligation. Often it is not quite clear whether the
UCC is indeed speaking of agreement or contract (as defined), or
whether this is one of those times when the context requires othervise,
and the words may therefore be used interchangeably.
There are other trivial but annoying examples of this process of







25. See, e.g., §§ 2-321, 2-503(1).(5).
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another meaning. "'Secondary party' means a drawer or endorser," 20
for instance, at least until, as silently as smog, context adds to the defi-
nition "the acceptor of a draft payable at a bank or the maker of a
note payable at a bank .... -27Definition-and-ignoring-of-definition is
discussed further in the account of notice and hnowledge.28
The sense that begins to emerge is that when a definition is preceded
by "unless the context otherwise requires," we are really being told
not to take the definition seriously, or-as it is sometimes said-liter-
ally. The draftsman is preparing us not for the ordinary vagaries of
life or language, but for his own goofs, warning us that while we are
to remember his definitions, he may forget them. His load thus light-
ened, the jolly draftsman finds it easy to incorporate into the UCC such
traditional claptrap as
[U]nless the content otherwise requires
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in
the plural include the singular ... 29
The formula is promptly ignored (or else serves to make the UCC
incredibly complex) in such phrases as "document or documents,"80
"fiduciary or fiduciaries,"31 "survivor or survivors"3 2 and "writing or
"writings." 3
Speaking as plainly as he can, the draftsman will never be completely
successful, but he can try. He can do better than cross his fingers, throw
salt over his left shoulder, and recite the formula, "unless the context
otherwise requires."
B. A Word Is a Word: The Circular Definitions
The major difficulty in verbal explanation of words lies in finding
familiar words with which to do the explaining. With children and
ignoramuses you sidle up to a definition, without really giving one.
"Hot is when it hurts." Or, as the UCG puts it, "[a] term or clause is
conspicuous when .... ,,34 The more sophisticated child is told "animal
includes a cow." Or, as the UCC puts it, " '[w]ritten' or 'writing' in-
26. § 3-102(1)(d).
27. § 3-501(l)(c).





33. § 9-105(1)U ) .34. § 1-201(10).
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dudes printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to
tangible form."35 Such a definition includes a cheese soufflI, and ex-
dudes hardly anything except an inadvertent belch, but it does make
the UCG flexible. Ultimately, children and readers of the UCC are
told, this "means" or this "is." There is another parallel: children and
readers of the UCC are both treated to nonsense definitions, but there
the parallels end. With children it is strictly for sport.
Some of the things the UCC calls "definitions" have hardly any
meaning-some no meaning at all-because they are circular. They
define a word with the same word, or with a variation of the word so
close that you return to the starting point almost unscathed by infor-
mation. Sometimes the circuit is short and easy to trace; sometimes
the circuit winds over hill and dale before sneaking back on itself.
One of the shorter circuits strewn through the UCC is rights-
remedies. A definition tells you:
"Remedy" means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party
is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal.80
Two paragraphs on, another definition tells you:
"Rights" includes remedies. 7
Just like that; you are now back at remedy. And to make sense of both
definitions you had best spell out remedial right, which as anyone can
see means a right, including the remedy, to a remedy, or a right, includ-
ing the remedy, for which there is a remedy, which means a remedial
right, unless the context otherwise requires, in which case you can stay
overnight.
Some years ago, a smiling paranoiac offered to prove to our class
in abnormal psychology that he was the true Christ and that Jesus was
an imposter. "It's simple," he said. "I am the Christ because the Christ
wouldn't lie to you." The startling swiftness of that circular explana-
tion is rivaled by the UCC on identification:
In the absence of explicit agreement identification occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods
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That is to say, when you make a contract for the sale of existing goods,
identification occurs when identification occurs, unless you explicitly
agree that identification does not occur when it occurs.
One of the longer circuits is found in the negotiation-holder-indorse-
ment syndrome.
The basic concept of the law of negotiable instruments is defined
as follows:
Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the
transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order
it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement; if
payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery.39
With key words italicized, it becomes clearer that to discover what
negotiation is you first have to know what is meant by holder and
indorsement.
The very next section tells you something about indorsement:
An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and
on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to
become a part thereof.40
The search for the sense of negotiation that hinges on indorsement
thus doubles back on the same holder that is a part of the definition
of negotiation. Holder must be the way out. Naturally, it is defined:
"'Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of
title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank.41
At this point your cry of despair is mingled with the shriek of the
wounded draftsman who has just bitten himself squarely in the back.
For the negotiation which led to holder has led to indorsement which
leads back to holder. And the negotiation which led to indorsement
has led to holder which leads back to indorsement.
From the dizzying shuttle between holder and indorsement there is
only one escape. In order to understand the UCC definitions in the
area of negotiable instruments, you must first know the law of nego-
tiable instruments. In other words, the Code is not a code that tells a
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pilation of notes that may serve to remind you of law you had better
know before you read the UCC.
For example, a check drawn "Pay to the order of Johm Doe" is
delivered to John Doe and stolen from him by Richard Roe. Roe writes
on the back, "Pay to Sol Soe," and underneath that forges the name
of John Doe. Sol Soe is legitimate and he indorses to another legiti-
mate who indorses to another legitimate, Thomas Toe.
In the talk of businessmen, bankers, and even lawyers, Sol Soe took
a check "indorsed to him," even though Richard Roe was a forger.
Even the UCC speaks of a "forged indorsement."'' It also says that
"unless the instrument dearly indicates that a signature is made in
some other capacity it is an indorsement." 3 If these quotes say any-
thing, they say that Thomas Toe, as well as Sol Soe, has become a
holder because each took a check "indorsed to him," even though the
immediate or an earlier indorsement was a forgery. But that is not
the law of negotiable instruments.
It is hornbook law that no one becomes a holder under a forged
indorsement.4 Thus when the UCC talks about indorsement requiring
a holder, and a holder being a person in possession of a negotiable in-
strument that has been drawn, issued, or indorsed to him, it means
(though it does not say so) that that phase of the definition doesn't
mean anything unless there is already a holder who became a holder
without any intervening taint of forgery. Only after you know that
result can you grasp the substance so studiously omitted by the drafts-
men from the UCC definitions of negotiation and holder and indorse-
ment. With that knowledge-from outside the UCO merry-go-round-
you are in a position to say that good faith Sol Soe (who had the mis-
fortune of not knowing that Roe was a crook) and better faith Thomas
Toe (who never dealt with a crook in his life) are not holders under
the UCC. The check was not drawn to either, was not issued to either,
and though it certainly looked "indorsed," it was not really "indorsed,"
because the indorsement was not by someone who was already a holder.
You can make words of the UCC definitions fit the law, but you can-
not learn that law from the definitions any more than John Locke's
blind man could know the color red from hearing a description of it.1
The very nature of the writings with which the UCC must deal is
42. § 3-419(l)(c).
43. § 3-402.
44. W. BrroN, HANDBOOK OF THM Aw oF B s AND NoTEs 250 (2d ed. 1961).
45. 2 J. Loc=x, AN EssAy CONCERNIN HUMAN UNDM"rLANDING 38-40 (A. Fraser ed. 1894).
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made similarly obscure by UCG definitions. In Article 3, subject to
context, "'[i]nstrument' means negotiable instrument." 40 By itself,
that would be a very short circuit indeed, except for the fact that another
section quickly gives you the requisites for a negotiable instrument.47
So it may be assumed that instrument is simply shorthand usage, like
calling someone by his first name. If that usage were uniform, there
would be fewer difficulties. But after that beginning, the skein of re-
peated instruments and negotiable instruments becomes hopelessly
tangled.
For example, draft, check, certificate of deposit and note are defined
in Article 3 so as to be negotiable instruments.48 But "[a]s used in other
Articles of this Act, and as the context may require ... [those expres-
sions] . . . may refer to instruments which are not negotiable within
this Article as well as to instruments which are so negotiable." 40 That
is only a starter. For one of these other articles-Article 4-adopts the
Article 3 definition of draft, check and certificate of deposit (though
not note, which is left to fly on its own).50 But in saying that the
Article 3 definition applies to Article 4, the reference is to Section
3-104, without specification of subsection-i.e., without saying that the
reference is to Section 3-104(2) which makes negotiable instruments of
draft, check and certificate of deposit, or to Section 3-104(3), which
says they may be "instruments which are not negotiable." As an added
fillip, Article 4 defines item to mean "any instrument for the payment
of money even though it is not negotiable but does not include
money... ,"51 so it is anyone's guess whether Article 4 is speaking
of negotiable instruments or something else when in the same section
it mentions item52 and check.53
The mud becomes thicker in Article 9 which adopts the Article 3
definitions for check and note. 4 As with Article 4, the reference is
again to Section 3-104, without specification of the negotiable or the
non-negotiable subsections. In addition, Article 9 has its own defini-
tions of instrument, which means not only "a negotiable instrument
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lany. 5 Whether this instrument swallows up the incorporated defi-
nitions of check and note, or whether they are intended (because
separately mentioned) to stand on an independent footing, is not
readily apparent.
After wandering in the wilderness of the other articles, it is com-
forting to return to Article 3, where at least almost from the start you
are told that instrument means negotiable instrument, unless of course
"the context otherwise requires."10 You turn then to Section 3-303,
"Taking for Value" which speaks of a holder taking "the instrument
for value," "a lien on the instrument, .... when he takes the instrument,"
but ends with a resounding thwack-"when he gives a negotiable in-
strument for it...." If that doesn't shake your confidence in the sense
of an unadorned instrument, you must wait until the final, bitter,
unannounced passage of this same Article 3, an article devoted to im-
pressing you with the fact that instrument means negotiable instru-
ment. The last word says:
This Article applies to any instrument whose terms do not pre-
clude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this
Article but which is not payable to order or to bearer, except
that there can be no holder in due course of such an instru-
ment.57
Home at last. An instrument is an instrument, negotiable or not. If
you now re-examine the definition of negotiation s in the light of this
last stab at the meaning of instrument, you may come to the conclusion
that under the language of the UCC you can negotiate an instrument
that is not negotiable, which ought to be the end of the line.
C. The Misleading Definitions
Haunting any draftsman is the fear that his new, sterile masterpiece
will be loused up by the old law. As some of the draftsmen of Article
9 put it,
the selection of the set of terms applicable to any one of the exist-
ing forms (e.g. mortgagor and mortgagee) might carry to some
extent the implication that the existing law referable to that form
was to be used for the construction and interpretation of this
Article. Since it is desired to avoid any such implication, a set of
55. § 9-105(1)(g).
56. Compare § 3-102(i)(e) with § 3-102(l).
57. § 3-805.
58. § 3-202(1); see p. 192 supra.
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terms has been chosen which have no common law or statutory
roots tying them to a particular form.50
If it were theoretically possible to select terms without roots in the
law, to achieve the requisite isolation it would also be necessary to
select terms without roots in the English language. And this the Code
has not done, either in Article 9 or elsewhere. It has not plumped for
symbolic logic, though that could not have hurt worse than the course
adopted. It has not used the device of the tax lawyers, a Subchapter S
corporation.60 Nor has it returned us to law French or Latin in a vain
search for the distinctive.61 The only gesture towards law Latin is in
the direction of utter confusion, for in Article 8 the old law expression
bona fide purchaser is given special definition. 62 It is not the same as
the standard law usage nor the same as the UCO usage of its apparent
English equivalent good faith purchaser.63
The UCC has used for definitions words that can be loosely described
as English. They have the appearance of English words. The form is
English, but the guts have been scooped out and scattered.
English does have words for special use. With a warning that here
is a special bastard, the English-speaking lawyer may prepare himself
for an encounter with someone other than an ordinary bastard. With
the Code, the special and ordinary are intermingled without warning.
Old words are given not merely new meanings, but meanings that
contradict their everyday usage in and out of the law, as well as con-
flicting with their meanings in other portions of the Code. The lan-
guage is difficult for anyone (even the draftsman) to follow. It is as
though one suddenly redefined ears to mean shoelaces, and went about
telling friends, "I put on my shoes and tied my ears." After a time, a
good friend might understand, whatever his private opinion might be.
Anyone else would dismiss it as gibberish. A sampling of similar gib-
berish follows.
1. Lien Creditor
A typical example of UCC definitions (though more excusable than
most instances since this one is partly inherited from the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act) is lien creditor. It is defined in Article 9 to mean
59. § 9-105, Comment 1.
60. See generally B. Brrrxm, FEDERu INCOME, EsrATE AND GFT TAXATION 740.44 (3d
ed. 1964).
61. See D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 6, chs. VII, IX.
62. § 8-302.
63. Compare § 5-108(3)(b) with § 2-702(3).
196
Vol. 77, 185, 1967
Uniform Commercial Code
a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by
attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit
of creditors from the time of assignment, and a trustee in bank-
ruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver in
equity from the time of appointment.0 4
Maybe there ought to be a special name for that kind of creditor.
Maybe he should be a Section 9-310(3) creditor or a gritch. But the
trouble with calling him a lien creditor is that the words individually
are in ordinary English usage and in ordinary law usage. Put together
as apparent English, lien creditor sounds like a creditor-with-a-lien.
That is the substance of the definition in Black's Law Dictionary. Yet
the linking of lien and creditor in the UCC definition eliminates thou-
sands of creditors with liens. The whole does not equal the sum of its
parts. The creditors can put up with that because they have their liens
to keep them warm, but it is hard on English and on people who try
to read it. This is especially so since lien separately and creditor sepa-
rately are used throughout the UCC. Even worse, the UCC definition
of creditor in Article 1 includes a lien creditor, without specifically
adopting the special Article 9 definition. Worse still, the Article 1
definition of creditor opposes to lien creditor certain portions of the
Article 9 definition of lien creditor:
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent
Articles of this Act which are applicable to specific Articles or
Parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this
Act:
(12) "Creditor" includes a general creditor, a secured creditor,
a lien creditor and any representative of creditors, including an
assignee for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a
receiver in equity and an executor or administrator of an in-
solvent debtor's or assignor's estate.("
The ordinary sense of this Article 1 definition excludes from the
meaning of lien creditor, and includes in the meaning of creditor, the
assignee, trustee and receiver who are specifially included in the Article
9 definition of lien creditor. Yet the Article 1 lien creditor is to be
included throughout the Code wherever the word creditor is used,
"unless the context otherwise requires." What kind of lien creditor?
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2. Account Debtor
Even so, lien creditor is all clarity and certainty compared with the
UCC's prize pseudomorph, the account debtor.00 Superficially, the
process of word creation is similar: Take two common words, join
them, eviscerate and add new definition that contradicts the sense of
the components parts. It is possible that that horrible recipe for mak-
ing a lien creditor inspired the creators of account debtor. If so, the
pupil has outstripped the teacher. The combination account debtor is
different from an ordinary sense to be gathered from the common
English words, i.e., someone who owes money as shown on his creditor's
books. Beyond that, the common English words account07 and debtoru8
have themselves been redefined in ways foreign to their original mean-
ings. And the UCC's combined form also contradicts the UCC's made-
up meanings for the two separate words. Here are the definitions:
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Account debtor" means the person who is obligated on an
account, chattel paper, contract right or general intan-
gible; ...
(d) "Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other
performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he
owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller
of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper. Where the
debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the same
person, the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral
in any provision of the Article dealing with the collateral,
the obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation,
and may include both where the context so requires .... 
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased
or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument
or chattel paper. "Contract right" means any right to payment
under a contract not yet earned by performance and not evi-
denced by an instrument or chattel paper. "General intangibles"
means any personal property (including things in action) other
than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents
and instruments7 0
The Code's account debtor thus describes both those "obligated on
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who by the Code's definition cannot be "obligated on an account," i.e.,
those obligated on chattel paper (excluded by the definition of account)
and those obligated on general intangibles (defined to exclude ac-
counts). Account debtor also describes those obligated on a contract
right, which sometimes does and sometimes does not produce an
account; if the "right to payment" is under a contract for something
other than sale or lease of goods or rendering of services, the definition
of account precludes the possibility of an account even though the
"right to payment" has been earned.7' (This is further confused by
the definition of proceeds which "includes the account arising when
the right to payment is earned under a contract right .... ,,7 thus
permitting the inference that an account always follows payment
earned.)
The debtor portion of account debtor makes sense only by ignoring
the UCC definition of debtor. The uncomplicated conclusion that a
debtor is someone who owes money falls afoul of the UCO definition
of debtor, which impartially includes people who owe money and peo-
ple who don't, e.g., a "seller of accounts, contract rights, or chattel
paper," and sometimes "the owner of the collateral" who owes nothing.
3. Farm Products
As with lien creditor and account debtor, the UCC definition of
farm products distorts the common understanding of the language, as
distinguished from merely giving special application to words of vari-
able content. Goods are classified as farm products, for example, if they
are "supplies used or produced in farming operations."7 3 Thus some-
thing may be a UCC farm product even though it is used, rather than
produced in "farming operations"; indeed, even though it is an English
language product of an oil well or a salt mine rather than a farm. For
purposes of classifying security for a loan, it may be desirable to treat
gasoline or salt used in farming operations in the same category with
anything else that a farmer can borrow on, but it is not necessary to
scuttle the English language in order to do so. When we run out of
words or imagination, it will be better to join the telephone company
in the candid confusion of digits than to pretend it is still English we
are writing.
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4. Notice, Knowledge
Notice and knowledge fall into another category of misleading UCG
definitions. Here the definition is given the appearance of precision
by such detailed refinement and subdivision of a specialized vocabu-
lary that it is almost inconceivable that nothing has been settled. Yet
on closer examination the definition turns out to be spun of a gossamer
that scarcely conceals the lack of any solid substance.
Subject to the well-worn "unless the context otherwise requires,"
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the
time in question he has reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it. "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of
similar import refers to knowledge rather than reason to know.
The time and circumstances under which a notice or notification
may cease to be effective are not determined by this Act1 4
The first thing to observe about this lead-off section on notice is that
there are three notices mentioned, and though all appear under the
section heading of "General Definitions," none is defined. The first
notice, the one in quotes in the first line, is the one that lawyers talk
about as a shorthand way of saying that a person is about to be treated
as though he knew something whether he does or not. The quotes
should properly be about the phrase "has notice," for that is what is
significant-that the person has it, like having measles or having a bad
time. If he's got it he's stuck, like it or not. But the definition doesn't
say that at all. It gives the appearance of being interested not in what
you have but "when" you got it.
The second notice is the "a notice" notice, which is much different
from the "has notice" notice. It is some sort of communication, often
a piece of paper with something written on it.
The third notice is the "notification" notice. Notice and notification
are used separately and interchangeably throughout the Code, and it
is only an occasional redundant reference to "notice or notification"
that might lead anyone to think there was a difference. The distinction
that ought to be made is that notification is the same as the "a notice"
notice, and so is not to be confused with the "has notice" notice.
74. § 1-201(25).
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Concentrating then on the "has notice" notice, a person "has 'notice'
of a fact when" he has actual knowledge, when he has received a notice,
or when from what is known he has reason to know. Know and knowl-
edge, the section tells us, are the same as actual knowledge. What is
actual knowledge? It doesn't say here or anywhere else in the Code,
though actual, both in ordinary English and in the language of the
law, is more a warning of uncertainty than a word.
There is some kind of an impression here that actual knowledge is
the real McCoy-hard core knowing, as distinguished from implied
or constructive kno-wledge. It is distinguished on the one hand from
whatever cerebral twitching is caused when one has received a notice,
and on the other from the hypothetical might-have-beens which the
law sweeps under reason to know. Whether there would be the same
gap between actual knowledge and actual receipt of notice or actual
reason to know is unclear. In any event, now that we know that when
the UCC says know or knowledge it means the actual stuff, we may
proceed to the next step:
A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another
by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the
other in ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes
to know of it. A person "receives" a notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which
the contract was made or at any other place held out by him
as the place for receipt of such communicationsY7
Since know, by UCC definition, means actual knowledge, the first
sentence is saying "whether or not such other actually comes to" have
actual knowledge. The difference between actually having actual
knowledge in Section 1-201(26) and only having actual knowledge in
Section 1-201(25) is not readily apparent. But you begin to get into
the swing of the thing when you read in Section 8-204 of "a person
with actual knowledge," which-in the light of the definition in Sec-
tion 1-201(25)-means actual actual knowledge. That gets to the heart
of the matter, which is either that plain knowledge doesn't mean very
much, or that no one-not even the draftsman-is expected to pay
attention to these definitions.
The UCC at this point is laying the groundwork for treatment in
the Code of the disappointment which often occurs in fact and in law
75. § 1-201(26).
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between sending and receiving. (Send is separately defined in Section
1-201(38) to cover the physical acts of mailing, etc.) The draftsmen
seem to be drawing a distinction between giving a notice and receiving
a notice, but that is only an appearance. For in Section 1-201(26), while
giving and receiving are discussed, they are not directly connected. It
does not say that A gives, whether or not B receives, but that A gives
whether or not B "actually comes to know of it," which under Section
1-201(25) is not the same as receiving a notice.
Further, A gives a notice not when he takes steps to see that B
receives it, but when he takes steps to inform B. And B receives a
notice not when he knows about it, but when "it comes to his atten-
tion." These are gratuitous and unexplained complications. Inform
and comes to his attention could be considered in the same category
with words like discover and learn which "refer to knowledge" 0 But
if that had been intended it would have been an easy thing to use the
words already defined.
The final glittering, metaphysical mishmash comes in Section
1-201(27):
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an or-
ganization is effective for a particular transaction from the time
when it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting
that transaction, and in any event from the time when it would
have been brought to his attention if the organization had exer-
cised due diligence ....
The opening words here now lump together the has notice of Section
1-201(25), the a notice (or notification) of Sections 1-201(25) and (26),
and knowledge. The rapid run of the one long sentence makes it sound
as though all of this is spoken of as being received, i.e., "[n]otice,
knowledge or a notice or notification received." One must pause to
consider not only that this "[n]otice . . . notice . . . received" would
be more than usual UCC doubletalk, but also that it is only for the
a notice (or notification) notice that receives has just been defined in
Section 1-201(26). Accordingly, one must reconstruct the sentence men-
tally to read: "Notice . . . is effective . . when . . . ," "knowledge ...
is effective . . . when ... " and "a notice ... received ... is effective
when ......
Even if the reader can keep himself continuously aware of all this
as he reads the sentence, he may yet have the uneasy feeling that he is
76. § 1-201(25).
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groping at vapors. In a haze of doublethink, he must remember that
an organization is to be treated as knowing something whether it
knows it or not, but that treating it like that will only be "effective"
(undefined) when the something is "brought to the attention [unde-
fined] of the individual conducting that transaction." He must also
keep straight that something of which the organization has actual
knowledge is not "effective" as actual knowledge until it is "brought
to the attention" or "would have been brought" to the attention of
the organization, though actual knowledge is something very different
from having "reason to know."
The best thing to do about the nice definitions of notice and knowl-
edge and the precise differences between giving and receiving is to
forget them. And that is just what the draftsman does whenever it
becomes important. Having made the verbal distinction between giving
and receiving notification, he proceeds to ignore it by using language
that carefully steers between giving and receiving, without saying
either. In the important definition of acceptance, the UCC says "Accep-
tance ... must be written on the draft .... It becomes operative
when completed by delivery or notification."7 7 Does that mean when
notification is given or received? In context, since delivery "means vol-
untary transfer of possession,"78 it is possible to conclude that the talk
is about receiving something, either the draft with the acceptance on
it, or a notification that the acceptance is on the draft. It is also pos-
sible to conclude that notification is opposed to delivery and so means
the giving of notification, not its receipt 79 If anyone had any confidence
in the definitions, it would also have been possible to say either "by
giving notification" or "by receipt of notification."
D. The Multiple and Missing Definitions
As in a Russian novel where the lady known as Krupskaya in chapter
I becomes Natasha in chapter V and turns out to be Dushinka in chap-
ter XXXIX, some of the definitions in the UCC make no pretense
of staying put.
Variations on an instrument have been discussed earlier. There are
also, for instance, three definitions of goodsf0 None of them is incor-
77. § 3410(1).
78. § 1-201(14).
79. § 3-410, Comment 5.
80. § 2-105(1).
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porated in Articles 1, 4, 5 or 6, where goods is used without confining
the sense to the three or any other definition s'
Document is even more itinerant. It wanders undefined through
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4, finally finding definition in Articles 5, 7 and 9.82
These definitions are not incorporated elsewhere in the Code, but
that doesn't mean they may be ignored. The Article 5 definition stirs
document into the same pot with documentary draft and document of
title, so that document includes document of title, which itself is
defined in Article 183 to include certain types of documents. The Ar-
ticle 7 and Article 9 definitions of document say that it "means docu-
ment of title as defined in... Article 1." These definitions not only
drag their own undefined documents into Article 5, which already
defines document, but also into Articles 1, 2, and 3 which do not define
it though they use it in a variety of ways. Article 4 ("Bank Deposits
and Collections") has much to do with documents of title, but doesn't
talk about them directly. Instead, it has a definition of documentary
draft (different from the Article 5 definition), which uses documents
in contrast to "securities or other papers to be delivered against honor
of the draft."84
The practice of defining, and then redefining or ignoring definition
is but a special instance of a more generalized malady that affects the
Code as a whole: an indifference to the draftsman's proper goal of
trying to make one word have one meaning, and vice versa.
II. One Word, One Meaning, and Vice Versa
Whether it results from carelessness or addiction to "elegant vari-
ation,"18 5 a change of words in mid-sentence can be jolting enough
even when legal implications are not at stake. The book was big, and
George liked the volume; Peter had ten fingers and many toes; etc.
For centuries, draftsmen of the law have tried to avoid a confusing
variety of words. They have been content to use the same word again
and again wherever the sense was the same, in the belief that where
different words are used, even a reasonable man might think some
different sense is intended.
81. E.g., § 1-201(9).
82. §§ 5-103(1)(b), 7-102(1)(e), 9-105(1)(e).
83. § 1-201(15).
84. § 4-104(1)(t).
85. Cf. H. FowLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 148 (2d rev. cd. E.
Gowers 1965)
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The UCO disregards this useful practice. Its multiple definitions 0
are only one example of the liberal spirit of indiscriminate variation
that gushes and spurts through the whole body of the Code.
A reader of the UCC must try to decide for himself or his client
whether there is really a difference of sense or only of words in a large
number of closely related and closely following pairs. For example,
compare the phrases in the first column with the similar phrases in
the second:
continues perfected87  remains perfectedgs
delivery concerned 9  deliveries affected O
fails to make delivery9' fails to deliver 2
imposed or permitted93  prescribed or permittedl
later holder95  subsequent holderM
noncompliance97  failure to complys
person making presentment99  person presenting'00
As a working hypothesis, you may decide to dismiss these as inconse-
quential variations which merely reflect the draftsman's occasional
susceptibility to the influence of non-legal prose style. But at about
the time that explanation contents you, you encounter variation that
is less explicable on the basis of the richness of non-legal English.
Thus, attorney's fees'0' and counsel fees; 102 conversion'03 and conver-
sion to his [its] own use;04 and with reference to goods, both loss...
or injury'0 5 and loss or damage.'00 Are there differences in meaning
here, or only in form? Can they be ignored? And if they are ignored,















101. §§ 3-106(1)(e), 3-604(1), 9-504(1)(a), 9-506.
102. § 7-601(1).
103. §§ 2-603(3), 7-210(9), 7-309(2), 8-318.
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then is there also no intended distinction, in spite of the clear verbal
difference, between domestic or foreign governmental regulation07 and
foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order?08
In the welter of changing words with or without changes of meaning,
the verb say is a special case. What does the Code say when it wants
to say that something says something? It could say say, but that is
hopelessly simple. In the form said, it is tolerable, so the Code says
said to contain.10 Beyond that the UCC offers a dozen or more vari-
ants, some of which could carry a nuance of meaning, and some perhaps
nuance on nuance, if only anyone could be certain just what nuance
was intended.
A writing, instead of saying, may describe, designate, disclose, ex-
press, fix, identify, indicate, name, provide, show, specify, state and
much more. In particular instances there is reason to select one of
these words rather than another. Thus the UCC chooses fixed period,110
but fortunately not fixed person. It is better to name or specify a
person; and yet there is very little reason in similar contexts sometimes
to name him and sometimes to specify him:
A warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other document of title is
negotiable
(a) if by its terms the goods are to be delivered to bearer or to
the order of a named person."
On the other hand, a warehouse receipt ought to embody
a statement whether the goods received will be delivered to the
bearer, to a specified person, or to a specified person or his order.112
Similarly, Article 3 includes variously "any person therein specified
with reasonable certainty," "names a payee,"11 "a specified person or
bearer"'1 4 and "payable to a named person.""5
You can also designate or identify people, so the UCC does that too,
with designate a specific payee,"06 and identifies the claimant.117 But if
there is an intended distinction between naming, specifying, designat-
107. § 2-614(2).
108. § 2-615(a).











ing and identifying people, the distinction does not come through loud
and dear, or even in a strong whisper.
So, too, with provide and state. Why one rather than the other? Why
both in the same sentence in reference to the same writing? Is some
nuance of meaning intended with:
Unless the bill of lading otherwise provides, the carrier may deliver
the goods to a person or destination other than that stated in the
bill . .. ?'Is
Would there be any difference in meaning if the two words were
reversed, or if one were used to the exclusion of the other?
The problem posed for the lawyer by any variation of word usage
is that he must at least pause to consider whether variation has pro-
duced significance. It is possible, for instance, that someone was trying
to convey a notion of greater generality by providing something rather
than stating it. Perhaps indicate'" was intended to be even more
general. Each must be fitted into a hierarchy of shading, if a hierarchy
was intended. Could anything turn on the difference between provid-
ing for something and indicating it? And if "an instrument shows the
date,"I20 is that still different from specifying or indicating it?
When you say something you express it in words. If you say that an
instrument expresses something, you may be saying nothing more than
that the instrument says it. Again you may be using the verb express
in an older sense sometimes favored by the law, i.e., the instrument says
it explicitly. Accordingly, it is unclear when the UCC uses the forms
of express ("expressed to be an order,"'' "expressed to be valid,"''1
"expressed in the instrument"'m ) whether it means merely that some-
thing is said, or that it is said in a certain way, i.e., explicitly. Cer-
tainly that is the prime meaning of the adjectival and adverbial forms
of express, as in express reservation,2 4 express terms,'.  expressly
states 2 6 And from the use of those adjectival and adverbial forms a
possible inference is that the verb form express means something dif-
ferent; such a conclusion would be questionable, for an overview of
118. § 7-303(1).
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the Code does not encourage one to reason from a premise that assumes
precision of language.
The difficulty of arriving at the meaning or meanings of express in
all its forms is complicated by another fact. While the UCC uses ex-
press adjectivally and adverbially to mean explicit, it also uses for the
same purpose forms of the word explicit itself. Thus while Article 3
says "express reservation,"'27 Article 5 says "explicit reservation."'2 8
Is there a difference? Article 2 says "explicitly extends"' 2 and "explic-
itly agreed,"30 while Article 8 uses "expressly states."' 31 If we are
dealing here with degrees of explicitness it would be helpful to know
it, for the permutations are almost endless.
The uncertainty of interpretation that follows upon a helter-skelter
use of state, provide, specify, show, designate and the rest is com-
pounded when the modifiers expressly, explicitly and specifically are
added to the verbs. The modifiers not only give one pause about the
meaning of the combination, e.g., expressly designated132 as opposed
to specifically states,3 3 but also by their presence here create a doubt
as to the meaning of the verb itself when the modifier is absent. For
example, in another moment of promiscuous word association, the
UCO speaks of
collateral already subject to a security interest in another juris-
diction when it is brought into this state. Such a financing state-
ment must state that the collateral was brought into this state
under such circumstances. 34
Apart from the stuttering shifts from one kind of state to another, the
problem here is how explicitly must the statement state what the UCC
says it must say? May it be stated less explicitly than in the Article 8
phrase:
even though the security expressly states that a person accepting
it admits such notice?135
The appearance and disappearance of these and other modifiers is
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twin questions: What does it mean when they are there? What does it
mean when they are not there? Here are some further examples:
effective realization'30  realization"
wholly inoperative3s  ineffective"O
due demand40  demand'4
valid rights of set-off' -  right of set-of'4 3
lawfully obtain possession44  obtain possession'4 5
One of the most frequently confusing uses of a modifier is ie unde-
fined combination commercially reasonable. This combination wan-
ders like a troubled spirit into a hundred UCC contexts, never certain
whether or not it has an identity separate from the ordinary plebian
reasonable. The wanderlust of commercially reasonable is only one
aspect of the uncertain use of words in the UCC; the phrase is also
significant as a manifestation of the Code's bewildering mania for the
use of the word reasonable. That particular vice must now be sepa-
rately considered.
III. Unreasonably Reasonable: Or, the Draftsman Resigns
Reasonable is a fine, useful, flexible word, 40 but it is not a substitute
for draftsmanship. Over-used, it can create more problems than it
solves by making a statute as flexible as mush. Thrown into the pot,
a pinch of reasonable here, a handful there, whenever one has the
madness upon him, the results-as the old limerick says-are most
horrid.
The UCC spares us a definition of reasonable, yet it tinkers with the
word enough to succeed in creating a suspicion that a UCO reasonable
might be a distinctive breed.
For one thing, every now and again the UCC says that something




139. §§ 2-602(1), 6-105, 7-202(3).
140. §§ 7-206(4), 8-316; cf. § 9-404(1)





146. D. fmmLnKo , supra note 6, §§ 119, 135.
147. § 4-103(4); see §§ 1-204(2). 2-504(a), 2-709(1)(b), 2-716(3). 3-505(l)(c).
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supposed that reasonable is not an absolute, it may be assumed that
this is lily-gilding and that even under the UCG circumstances will
influence reasonableness even where the draftsman does not say so
explicitly.
On that assumption, it is not unreasonable to believe that in any
sort of a commercial code, the commercial aspects of a transaction will
be among the circumstances affecting reasonableness. The UCC shakes
that simple belief with a haphazard use of the expression commercially
reasonable. The UGG says that some things are to be reasonable and
others commercially reasonable, without telling us whether we are
traveling up or down the scale of reasonableness. It becomes a rite of
divination to decide when reasonable alone takes into consideration
the commercial point of view, and when it does not, or to decide when
and how commercially reasonable is different from ordinary reasonable
reasonable.
For purposes of general application in the Code, Article 1 says that
[w]hat is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the
nature, purpose and circumstances of such action. 48
Accordingly, in a variety of commercial contexts the UCC speaks of
reasonable time, e.g., for a written confirmation of a contract between
merchants, 149 for a merchant's offer to stay firm,150 for shipment or
delivery,151 etc. In other equally commercial contexts, the UCG speaks
of commercially reasonable time, e.g., for a merchant-seller's retention
of goods after sale, 52 for resale by a seller, 53 or for awaiting perfor-
mance by a repudiating party. 5 4 If there is any difference between
reasonable time in a commercial context and a commercially reason-
able time, the UCC does not say what it is. It does manage to com-
pound the uncertainty of any sort of time standard by requiring a CIF
seller to tender the buyer's needed documents with commercial prompt-
ness,5 5 thus imposing an obligation with an undefined if not undefin-









155. § 2-320(2)(e); see § 2-320, Comment 11.
156. § 2-504(b).
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In a sentence applying alike to merchants and others, the UCO with-
out pausing for breath speaks of reasonable grounds for insecurity and
a commercially reasonable suspension of performance.10 7 It proceeds to
say that "[b]etween merchants the reasonableness of grounds for inse-
curity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined
according to commercial standards,"'I8s and adds a further provision
applying alike to merchants and others that speaks of a reasonable
time. 59 These quick leaps from reasonable to commercial and back are
as difficult to follow in reading as in practice. The Comments relate
the whole business to the needs of "commercial men,"lMo and make it
at least doubtful that these differences of language are intended to con-
vey any difference in meaning at all.
If something can be reasonable, it may also be unreasonable, which
the UCC expresses in a number of ways. A buyer "may 'cover' by mak-
ing in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable pur-
chase ... ."I61 With that double negative the draftsman has hit upon
one of the only ways of complicating within a reasonable time. The
Comments, with a hint of some kind of "in" knowledge, tell us that the
test here is only "similar to that generally used in this Article as to
reasonable time and seasonable action."' 02 This possibility of an in-
verted or hidden delicacy of meaning is accentuated elsewhere in the
UCC where reasonable instructions are opposed to those not reason-
able,'6 which is a hair and a holler away from an unreasonable in-
struction.
The final breakdown of communication and of the distinction be-
tween what is reasonable and what is not occurs in Article 5:
Unless othenise specified the customer bears as against the issuer
all risks of transmission and reasonable translation or interpreta-
tion of any message relating to a credit104
What kind of risk does the customer bear? Since the wording makes
it "all risks of transmission," but only "all risks of... reasonable trans-
lation," it ought to be a good guess that the risk is not unlimited. A






162. § 2-713, Comment 2.
163. § 2-603(1).
164. § 5-107(4).
165. § 5-107, Comment 8.
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[s]ubsection (4) distributes the risks, as between customer and is-
suer, of errors in transmission and translation by placing them on
the customer in the absence of specific agreement to the contrary.
If that is what the draftsman meant, the reasonable here throws you
off completely. It gives the impression that someone is talking about
some expectable degree of error; yet as interpreted, the risk of reason-
able translation can mean the risk of unreasonable mistranslation.
After that, the possibilities inherent in trying to measure reasonable-
ness by standards not manifestly unreasonable"'0 seem almost endless.
Reasonable tends to be self-multiplying. The more it is used, the less
it is used up, and the more one feels the need to use it. The very fact
that one thing has been qualified by reasonableness makes it seem
proper that almost anything should be so qualified, and at the same
time raises frightening conjectures about possible interpretations if
reasonable is not mentioned at all.
Article 2 is one of the more unreasonably reasonable articles of the
UCC. Section 2-706, for example, hooks commercially reasonable on to
method, manner, time, place and terms of sale. It also includes reason-
able notification, notice and inspection, and a "reasonably identified."
Inevitably, it speaks not of an available market but of one reasonably
available,1 7 which (says the Comment) is a question of "commercial
reasonableness in the circumstances."'168 On the other hand, elsewhere
in Article 2 a "carrier becomes unavailable . . . but a commercially
reasonable substitute is available . . ."169 and goods are to be kept
available.170 (In Article 7, "adequate facilities for weighing" are made
"available,"'' and in Article 9 by agreement a secured party "may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available,
. . .,,)172 Can it be thought that the UCC actually intends reasonable
availability in some of these cases and absolute availability in the
others? It seems more likely that when a draftsman thinks of it, he is
as appalled at absolutes as most other people,' 73 and even less sure of
his ground. So every now and then, but without consistency, he drops
in a reasonable to reassure and protect himself.
So it goes. Not only available and reasonably available, but also
166. See §§ 1-102(8), 4-103(1), 8-402(2),(3)(b), 9-501(3).
167. § 2-706(4)(b). See also § 8-104(1)(a).





173. D. MELumKOr, supra note 6, at 395.
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expense incurred76  expenses reasonably incurred1'7
identify' 78  reasonably identify'70
indicate'80  -reasonably indicates '
induce82  reasonably induce'8 3
necessary'84  reasonably necessary85
promptly M; reasonably prompt'87
Reasonable is not the villain. The problem is the lack of consistency.
IV. Clarity and the Long, Long Sentence
It is possible to be unclear in a relatively short sentence, as the UCC
demonstrates time and again.
Take for example, the person to pay:
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(b) An "order" is a direction to pay and must be more than an
authorization or request. It must identify the person to pay
with reasonable certainty. It may be addressed to one or
more such persons jointly or in the alternative but not in
succession. s8
Once you have identified the person to pay, what happens? Does he
get paid, or does he pay? To old commercial law buffs, the person to
pay in this definition of order is most certainly the person to do the
paying, not the person to get paid. A careful reading of the three sen-
tences can lead you to the right conclusion, especially if you know in
advance what you are looking for, as most students and businessmen
and non-commercial lawyers do not. If you know in advance that the
order being defined here is the order later referred to as an order to
174. § 8-402(1),(1)(b),(e).
175. §§ 8-401(1)(b), 8-402(4).
176. § 4-503.
177. §§ 7-209(1), 2-711(3).
178. §§ 8-403(i)(a), 5-104(2), 4-206, 3-509(2).
179. §§ 1-206(1), 5-116(2)(b).
180. §§ 3-105()(f), 7-501(l), 2-611(1), 8-319(a), 1-206(l), 2-201(l)
181. §§ 2-709(1)(b), 2-716(3).
182. § 5-119(2).
183. § 2-608(l)(b).
184. §§ 7-209(1), 7-507(1).
185. §§ 2-503(1), 2-511(2).
186. §§ 2-504(b),(c).
187. § 4-204(1). See also § 4-406(1).
188. § 3-102(1)(b).
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pay, s9 and not the order referred to in payable to order,90 it will help.
It will also help if you know that the predecessor Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, in Section 1(5), covered this point with the words:
Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named
or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.
It will be especially helpful if you learn, perhaps a bit wistfully, that
on the Continent they say about the same thing with a shocking di-
rectness:
A bill of exchange contains:
3. The name of the person who is to pay (drawee). 191
Once you have learned, however, that person to pay is not on the
receiving end, your troubles are not over. Apart from learning the
myriad possibilities of the UCC definition of person,1 2 you must face
up to the fact that "a person who has engaged in a transaction or made
an agreement within this Act" is a party,193 unless, of course, the con-
text, etc. You will accordingly conclude that the UCC is still talking
about the person who has to pay when it says:
[U]nless an earlier time is agreed to by the party to pay, payment
of an instrument may be deferred without dishonor pending rea-
sonable examination .... 194
Having made the leap from person to pay to party to pay, you are ready
to examine Section 3-304(1), which says:
The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence
of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to
call into question its validity, terms or ownership or to
create an ambiguity as to the party to pay.
Does this still mean someone who has to pay, or someone who gets
paid? It is less than clear. The drawee, for example, need not have
engaged in any transaction or agreement whatsoever until he becomes
an acceptor; until then he is not a party to the instrument. Who then
189. § 3-104(1)(b).
190. § 3-104(i)(d).
191. Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory







is the party to pay? If he is not the person to do the paying, perhaps
the UCC could be talking about the person who is to get paid.
Equally short and unclear is the phrase one of two or more.
No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker or
acceptor affect his liability on the instrument. Such words added
to the signature of one of two or more makers or acceptors create
a presumption that the signature is for the accommodation of the
others.195
Can this mean what it says? Does it apply only to one of two or more,
or would it also apply when the words were added to the signatures of
two of three or more, etc.? Does it mean what it says, or does it mean
that the presumption arises when the words are added to the signatures
of less than all of the makers or acceptors?
Ambiguity is a hazard of any draftsmanship, but there is at least one
road to ambiguity that has proved itself infallible over the years. That
is the long, long sentence. The long, long sentence cannot be deter-
mined by some arbitrary word count. It is characterized by a preference
for squeezing too much law into one sentence, a practice which has for
centuries caused trouble for lawyers. The genesis of the trouble in an
age of illiteracy 96 hardly recommends the practice to 20th century law-
yers. But it persists, and has led the draftsmen of the UCC into a
course that made it much easier to be ambiguous than precise.
For an easy start, take for example the definition of presentment:
Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made upon
the maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the
holder. 97
To anyone searching for information, this definition is as misleading
as to say:
A mouse is what is eaten or caught by a trap or a cat.
Each is a relatively short long, long sentence, and each is intelligible
only if you already know what it is trying to say. Unless you know in
advance that traps don't eat mice you are in trouble. Similarly, to read
the UCC section you must know in advance that you present to mak-
ers and acceptors for payment but not for acceptance; the Code makes
grammatical sense but commercial-law nonsense. Yet nothing in the law
195. § 3-416(4).
196. D. M=.LKoFE, supra note 6, §§ 82, 83, 106, 125.
197. § 3-504(1).
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requires this peculiar phraseology.198 It is just a needlessly big mouth-
ful. Several smaller bites would make it easy.
A similar and less readily resolvable ambiguity occurs in the chock-
full lead sentence of Section 3-110, "Payable to Order":
An instrument is payable to order when by its terms it is payable
to the order or assigns of any person therein specified with reason-
able certainty, or to him or his order, or when it is conspicuously
designated on its face as "exchange" or the like and names a
payee.3.9
Experience with the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Section
8 ("[T]he instrument is payable to order where it is drawn payable to
the order ... ") will lead the initiated to recognize at once that this
is saying something more than that an instrument is payable to order
when it is payable to the order. After a time you can live with the
burden of knowing that payable to order is being used first in the sense
of a legal conclusion and next in the sense of the exact wording of a
writing, a sense often conveyed by italics or quotation marks,
But with the typical run-on style of the long, long sentence, it is not
as easy even for the initiated to digest the effect of the word cluster
surrounding "exchange." Taken literally, the UCC language would
mean that any instrument-bill or note-with a named payee, becomes
payable to order if it conspicuously bears the magic word "exchange."
It has been so interpreted. 20 The Assistant Reporter for Article 3 gives
the language a somewhat different reading. He suggests that the UCC
here "nods toward international unification of the law."2 01 "Compare,"
he says, "UCC § 3-110(1) making negotiable a bill designated on its
face 'exchange' or the like, with the civil law rule making the words
'bill of exchange' a substitute for words of order."202 Does that mean,
then, that the words of the Code are to be pulled apart and-as in the
case of presentment-applied distributively, so that exchange will make
an order instrument of a bill of exchange but not of a promissory note?
The problem of interpretation here is that the word exchange has
very little to do with making instruments order paper either in En-
198. Cf. UNIFORm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw § 145.
199. § 3-110(1).
200. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The Negotiable Instruments Law
Compared with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 24 (1953).
201. Leary, Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 198, 203 (1960). See also Nav YoRK LAW REvisioN COMMISSION rOR 1955,
REPORT No. 2, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 813-14.
202. Leary, supra note 201, at 203 n.14 (emphasis added).
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gland or on the Continent. In both areas, if there is a named payee,
an instrument may be transferred by indorsement, whether it be a bill
of exchange or a promissory note, and whether or not the word order
is used, so long as the instrument itself does not prohibit transfer. -0
In England, both bill and note are said to be "payable to order" with-
out the word "order."20- In Europe, both bill and note, "even ff not
expressly drawn to order, may be transferred by means of endorse-
ment."205 The only relevance of "exchange" is that in the Continental
practice, a bill of exchange (or lettre de change) is supposed to contain
those very words, as a promissory note (or billet i ordre) must contain
those words, and a cheque that word.20
That leaves the UCC halfway to nowhere. Exchange certainly sounds
like a reference to a bill of exchange. On the other hand, in view of
the language of the section, there is as much reason to make it apply
to a note as to a bill. Another possibility is that a very well hidden
meaning lurks in the phrase "'exchange' or the like." It is possible
that "or the like" does not refer to another word that looks or sounds
like the word exchange, but rather to a word which in the Continental
practice would have like effect on negotiability. If exchange has the
effect of the Continental bill of exchange, then what has the effect of
promissory note?
With the long, long sentence, it is an easy matter to dump a problem
and forget it, to assume it is taken care of because mentioned, without
too much concern about what human beings may make of it.
In this same category is Section 1-102(3), a subject for treatises yet
unborn:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement,
except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obli-
gations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed
by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties
may by agreement determine the standards by which the perform-
ance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are
not manifestly unreasonable.
Pause for a moment over the italicized words only. What obligations
203. Cf. § 3-805.
204. The Bills of Exchange Act, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, §§ 8(4), 89(1) (188,2).
205. Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promisory Notes,
supra note 191, art. 11, at 277; id. art. 77, at 305; Convention Providing a Uniform Law
for Cheques, March 19, 1931, annex I, art. 14, 143 L.N.T.S. 357, 377.
206. Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes, supra note 191, art. 1(1), at 275; id. art. 75(1). at 303; Convention Providing a
Uniform Law for Cheques, supra note 205, art. 1(1), at 377.
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of care are these words talking about? Is this like payable to order,
which can refer either to a legal conclusion or to those very words? Are
we talking here about obligations of care as a legal conclusion, whether
or not the precise word care is used? Or is it only care described as care
that is an obligation of care "prescribed by this Act"? Further, does the
obligation of care mean both senses of care that the UCC deals with?
There is care in the sense of being careful, variously described as
care,207 ordinary care,208 reasonable care,20 9 and the care of a reasonably
careful man "under like circumstances." 21 0 There is also care in the
sense of taking care of something, e.g., goods--"caring for and sell-
ing,' '2 1 care and custody."212
Both senses of care being essential to many commercial transactions,
it often happens that the UCC tells us how careful we must be in tak-
ing care of something. Sometimes, without using the word care, the
UCC merely spells out the action to be taken.21 8 Sometimes it explicitly
uses care (being careful) in the context of taking care of something.21 4
Does the prohibition against disclaimer apply to all of these obliga-
tions? Section 1-102(3) does not supply the answer, not even when con-
trasted with the similar but different language of Article 4.21 5 This is
not a case where a lawyer may simply note for future reference that
the Code is deliberately flexible. It is rather a problem of being unable
to determine from the language of the UCC whether or not any con-
sideration at all was given to the possible ambiguity of the language
used.
Here is another sentence, which by trying to make too much sense
succeeds only in mixing sense and nonsense:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes
the instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an ac-
tion on a simple contract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, nonper-
formance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or de-
livery for a special purpose (Section 3-408); and
207. §§ 4-406(4), 5-109(2)
208. §§ 4-103(1), (3), (5), 4-202(1), 4-212(4)(b), 4.406(3).
209. §§ 2-602(2)(b), 4-406(1), 9-207(1).
210. §§ 7-204(1), 7-309.
211. § 2-603(2).
212. §§ 2-710, 2-711(3), 2-715(1).
213. §§ 2-603(1), 2-604, 4-204(1), 9-207(2).
214. §§ 2-602(2)(b), 4-202(1), 7-204(1), 9-207(1).
215. § 4-103(1).
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(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the
instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfac-
tion to such holder would be inconsistent with the terms of
a restrictive indorsement.... 216
Taken as written, this says in English that
[u]nless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person
takes the instrument subject to . . . the defense that he .. . ac-
quired it by theft....
The negative implication here that a thief might have the rights of
a holder in due course is careless error, contrary to the express provi-
sion of Section 3-201(1). Nonetheless, error or not, that is what it im-
plies. The draftsman has sacrificed accuracy and clarity to satisfy his
penchant for getting it all into one sentence.
Bogged down in an even gummier quagmire is that monstrosity the
holder in due course acting in good faith.217 No one has yet given a
satisfactory explanation of what is meant by language which says that
[a]ny person who obtains payment... warrants to a person who
in good faith pays.., that
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or
drawer is unauthorized, except that this warranty is not
given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature;
or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signa-
ture, whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course
took the draft after the acceptance or obtained the ac-
ceptance without knowledge that the drawer's signa-
ture was unauthorized; . . .!!Is
Under this section a holder in due course is to be preferred over a
peasant when he has knowledge that a signature is phony. To protect
him in that guilty knowledge, the law presumably permits him to pre-
sent for payment without requiring from him a false warranty of his
ignorance. How he may walk up to the pay window with a black con-
science ("an obvious fraud") 219 and still be acting in good faith ("hon-
216. § 3-306.
217. § 3-417(1)(b), (c); cf. § 4-207(I)(b), (c).
218. § 3-417().
219. See § 3-417, Comment 4.
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esty in fact")220 is an unexplained mystery. Nestled in the protective
camouflage of a 245-word sentence, holder in due course acting in good
faith may be unobtrusive enough. Flushed out, it amounts to double-
talk. The time for rationalizing the language was in the drafting stage.
Every reader of the UCC will find his own candidate for first place
in the cross-country sentence derby.
Some will prefer the relatively short wallop of the definition:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in
good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in vio-
lation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party
in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the busi-
ness of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawn-
broker ... .221
So much has been stuffed into the space between the head and tail of
this dog that the draftsman manages to create doubt as to whether the
pawnbroker referred to is a buyer or a seller. In the rambling flow of
words, "a person in the business of selling goods of that kind" is joined
to the exception of the pawnbroker, and the connection is made
stronger by the stubborn refusal to punctuate. A comma before "but"
would have helped stop the flow of words, but only radical surgery
would effect a complete cure. None of this deviousness was present in
the language of the section's predecessor, which said quite bluntly:
"Buyer in the ordinary course of trade" does not include a pledgee,
a mortgagee, a lienor or a transferee in bulk.222
Other readers can pass many hours untangling party and adverse
claimant, each referred to in three different ways in the space of one
sentence.223 Some may ponder the effect of the "failure... in effecting
any required presentment" when it is "effective or unnecessary." -2221 An-
other may wonder if Mark Twain would have been as critical of the
German language if he had read the UCC on "publishing . . . in a
newspaper . . . an advertisement. '225
One final exhibit. The numerous possibilities raised by covering too
much in one sentence very often mean that in the end not enough has
been covered. Take for instance this bewildering grab bag of bits and
pieces reciting the consequences of an installment contract:
220. § 1-201(19).
221. § 1-201(9).





Vol. 77, 185, 1967
Uniform Commercial Code
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conform-
ing if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that
installment and cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a de-
fect in the required documents; but if the non-conformity does not
fall within subsection (3) and the seller gives adequate assurance
of its cure the buyer must accept that installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or
more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole con-
tract there is a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party rein-
states the contract if he accepts a non-conforming installment with-
out seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action
with respect only to past installments or demands performance as
to future installments.220
As a matter of ordinary English, the first half of paragraph (2) draws
a dear-cut distinction between two types of non-conformity, and im-
plies that there is at least a third type of non-conformity. Type A Non-
Conformity has two characteristics: it substantially impairs value and
it is incurable. Type B Non-Conformity is an unqualified absolute-
"a defect in the required documents." The unmentioned Type C Non-
Conformity (which could be further subdivided) is what is left: the
whole of the commercial law's menagerie of non-conformities minus
only Type A and Type B. Reading no further than the semicolon, one
may reasonably conclude that there may be rejection not only for Type
A, but also that there may be a rejection for a Type B Non-Conformity
even though it leaves value unimpaired and is curable. The apparent
sharp disparity between the requirements in the two cases could be ra-
tionalized on the basis of the traditional commercial interest in the cer-
tainty of documents.22 Down to the semicolon, Type C Non-Conform-
ity continues to float in limbo.
Beyond the semicolon lies chaos. The UCC now says "the non-
conformity," as though all along it had been talking of only one sort.
It also talks about "assurance of cure." Does that apply to one, two or
three of the types of non-conformity? It surely cannot apply to Type A.
An assurance of curing the incurable smacks of more snake oil than the
UCC ought to tolerate, although if you can revoke the irrevocable2 s
even this cannot be ruled out entirely. Does it apply only to Type C,
the non-conformity that wasn't mentioned before the semicolon? Or
226. § 2-612(2), (8).
227. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under
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does it apply also to Type B Non-Conformity (of documents)? This
could be justified on the ground that "[t]he buyer may reject . . ."
states a general rule (before the semicolon), and that this general rule
is qualified by the particular rule "the buyer must accept" (after the
semicolon). The language is ambiguous and opinions vary.229
Perhaps what it all means could be said more coherently if (adopting
a suggestion)230 we talked first of what the UCG puts last-"breach of
the whole." Perhaps it would also help to say quite plainly what the
statute applies to and what it does not apply to. All of this must rest
in perhapses, because one must still guess at the sense of the words the
statute has used; but here is a stab at what the UCC might be saying
in Section 2-612:
(2) Breach of the whole contract: buyer or seller may cancel an
installment contract only if a default by the other substantially im-
pairs the value of the whole contract, This right to cancel the
whole contract-insofar as it is based on default in a particular
installment-is waived if
(a) the buyer accepts a non-conforming installment without
seasonable notification of cancellation; or
(b) buyer or seller
(i) brings an action relating only to past installments; or
(ii) demands performance as to future installments.
(3) Breach of an installment:
(a) Default by buyer: Not covered by this subsection.
(b) Default by seller: The buyer may reject a particular install-
ment only if
(i) he cancels the contract under Section 2-612(2); or
(ii) an incurable non-conformity of goods substantially
impairs the value of that installment; or
(iii) there is an incurable non-conformity in the required
documents; or
(iv) the seller fails to give adequate assurance (Section
2-609) that he will cure any other non-conformity.
V. The Next Time
The collection of UCC language vices in the preceding pages is by
no means exhaustive. It is, however, a sampling extensive enough to
make it very clear that there is more than enough of a bad thing,
enough to make it relevant to inquire (1) why this has happened, and
(2) whether anything can be done about it.
229. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 227, at 225-27; cf. § 2-612, Comment 4.
230. Id. at 227.
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A. Why UCCtalk is like that
By word of mouth a canard passes among lawyers that a dead man
is responsible for all the language ills of the UCC. If Karl Llewellyn
had any failing it was not illiteracy, and in any event there is ample
evidence that the UCC had not one but scores of draftsmen 1 Too
many cooks did not improve the broth, but even that is not a sufficient
explanation of the tortured phrasing. The Code itself is the best evi-
dence that the language of the Code was the least important consid-
eration.
What the draftsmen intended was to dange the law, and then-
above everything else- to make it everywhere the same. The 18th cen-
tury British dictum that "in all mercantile transactions the great
object should be certainty"232 was taken to mean in the context of the
American system that what was needed was uniformity. And the path
to uniformity was conceived to be the adoption by everyone of the
same statutory words, regardless of what those words were, regardless
of whether those words might be so ambiguous as to result in a thou-
sand varying interpretations that ultimately achieve the very opposite
of uniformity. Accordingly, the managers of the operation set about
drafting and re-drafting, patching and revising, bargaining to achieve
agreement among lawyers and carriers and businessmen, bankers and
brokers and candlestick makers. Each dickered-out section has its ovm
history of travail. 3 Once agreement was reached, the compromise for-
mula became sacrosanct, no matter what the ingredients. This was it.
The result is not so much a code, as a paste-up memorandum of agree-
ment. Some of the participants in the individual struggles doubtless
knew at the moment of accord what the memorandum meant as to
their particular little bargain; and so it was sealed with the understand-
ing that it would go into the ultimate master memorandum unchanged.
That other stated purpose of the UCC--"to . . . clarify . . . the
law," 23 -- has been taken as a prelude to uniformity, rather than a
necessary element of uniformity. Clarify has been understood in the
limited sense of ironing out some of the conflicts in the law of com-
mercial transactions: an acceptance "must be written on the draft," ' 3
231. UNrwoi COmmRCIAL CODE, Comment to Title.
232. Vallejo v. Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143, 153, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (1774) (Mansfield,
L.J.).
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a "payee may be a holder in due course,"236 and many others. An
admirable purpose indeed, but certainly not the whole nor even the
ordinary sense of clarify. It requires a mastery of doublethink to be-
lieve it possible to achieve clear law with unclear language. You must
take Mansfield's criterion of certainty, equate it with uniformity, strain
it carefully through Orwell, and come up with the proposition that
you clarify the law by making it uniformly unclear.
Yet that is very nearly the position of the Permanent Editorial Board
-a sort of French Academy of the UCC charged with guarding the
purity of UCC talk. In its first report of stewardship, the Board came
out foursquare against the notion that clarity was at least as imperative
a purpose of the UCC as uniformity. "We certainly do not have any
authority," they declared, "to undertake a rewriting of the Code or
to make amendments merely because someone feels that a particular
provision might have been drafted with greater clarity. The only justi-
fication for 'clarifying amendments' must be found in clause (d) of
Article SEVENTH... ."27 And as clause (d) explains, "[a]mendments
shall be approved and promulgated when ...an amendment or a
group of amendments would, in the opinion of the Board after inves-
tigation, lead to the wider acceptance of the Code by states which have
not as yet enacted it, and would likely be enacted by those states which
have already adopted the Code." 38
That of course is UCCtalk. It means that there won't be any "clarify-
ing amendments" unless they help sell the Code to some still uncom-
mitted pigeon. It is a candid if unreasonable expression of preference
for uniformity over old-style clarity, ignoring in passing a general
welfare clause that gives the Board a suitably ambiguous authority to
propose amendments when experience shows that the Code ". . . for
any other reason obviously requires amendment." 239 Thus the Board
has given an initial blessing to any confusion which crept into the
Code in its whirlwind metamorphosis from inspiration into holy writ
in but slightly more time than it takes to grow a voter.
B. "In due time .... "
It might be supposed that this was merely a tactical retreat, i.e,,
uniformity first, to be followed rapidly by clarification. But the Per-
236. § 3-302(2).
237. PERANENT EDrroRuIL BOARD FOR THE UNIFOM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT NO. 1,
at 9 (1962).
238. Id. at 14.
239. Id. at 12, 14.
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manent Editorial Board evidences no intention of moving in that di-
rection. Its second report, a remarkable document which takes 301
pages to say "No," rejects every change by the adopting states. If that
sounds arbitrary, the Board has explained its long range views in these
terms:
Lest the position of the Board be misunderstood, it may be worth
while to say that the Board does not take the position that the
1962 Official Text is "the last word" and that the Code may not
be improved as experience under its provisions develops. In due
time, the Board intends to make a comprehensive examination of
the Code from beginning to end. But experience has taught those
interested in the uniformity of our statutory law that it has been
much easier to get "uniform laws" on the books in the first in-
stance than it has been to interest legislatures in bringing them
up to date by amendment.2 40
"In due time" translates out of UCCtalk into English as "when the
sky rains potatoes." But even if that happens, the Board's gloomy fore-
cast of the unlikelihood of getting any amendments generally adopted
carries with it an implied resignation to living with a statute that lacks
clarity, so long as it is uniformly unclear. The uniformity the UCC
aims at ignores the internal discords of the statute in favor of sticking
with something that reads pretty much the same from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. True, the UCC pleads for construction that will promote
continued uniformity,241 but the lack of internal consistency and clarity
in the statute itself is the best possible assurance that in the long run
construction will not be uniform. It is a good bet that whatever uni-
form "clarification" of the law is to be achieved by the UCC has already
been achieved, except that unroped Louisiana may yet be rounded up
and branded.
C. From here on ....
The official resistance to "clarifying" the UCC does not mean that
it is fruitless to criticize the Code's draftsmanship. Even if we are to
be stuck with UCCtalk for another generation or so, if we are suffi-
ciently annoyed with this langnage midden we may be aroused to do
something about it the next time around. Before we start on UCC, Jr.,
or some other as yet unconceived crusade for nationwide conformity
240. REPORT No. 2, supra note 10, at 12.
241. § 1-102.
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(perhaps even in the course of the "restudy in depth" of Article 9),242
it may be possible to get some broad agreement on how the thing is
to be drafted.
First must come a recognition that it is not enough to be concerned
merely with what is said and not with how it is said. Having been
burned more often than most people, lawyers ought to know by now
that what and how are inseparably joined, and that when how gets
drunk, what stumbles.243
Second, UCCtalk ought to convince us that there is nothing to lose
by at least trying to write a statute of this sort in the best ordinary
English that can be mustered for the job. Here we act in public; we
draft, not for draftsmen alone, not even (in a field like commercial
transactions) only for lawyers. If technical terms must be used, let them
be kept to a minimum and explained where necessary. Where a unique
definition has an overriding utility, it ought to be used and used con-
sistently. But where the English that laymen and lawyers use every day
is more than adequate to the task, there is no reason to ignore it. And
one-sentence paragraphing has long since ceased to be the hallmark
of the literate.
Third, at the earliest possible stage, the draftsmen ought to sift each
scrap of draft and reproduce its essential language in the form of an
index or concordance. Each such index, placed in the hands of a central
drafting staff, should then be included in a cumulative index of the
growing statute and made available to successive draftsmen of indi-
vidual portions of the statute, so that everyone will know the vocabu-
lary being used. Periodically, the central drafting staff could revise the
index, eliminating duplications and inconsistencies. At the least this
would help avoid calling the same thing by different names. At best
it could focus attention on lack of uniform usage generally. It could
raise questions as to reason or lack of reason for variant usage before
opposing draftsmen became too stubbornly dug in behind their favor-
ite verbiage. In a statute which represents as vast an undertaking as
does the UCO, the computer might be of assistance in the indexing
process.
Fourth, anyone who wants to play the game of Uniform Law ought to
agree in advance on the basic rules of the game. Not the least of these
242. PERIANENT EDIrroTIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, RtroInr No. 3,
at x (1967).





is that when the players arrive at Memorandum of Agreement, they
are only at a checkpoint, not at the end of the game. Ultimately, each
Memorandum of Agreement should be recast to conform to an overall
language pattern of the statute or code. The recasting should be done
by one draftsman or one small group of draftsmen, with knowledge
not only of the details of each bargain, but of the grand plan of the
statute.
These are minimum essentials. Without agreement on these, the
pursuit of "uniformity" will achieve something truly remarkable: it
will make monstrosity available to everyone, and in the end achieve
not uniformity but chaos.
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